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Abstract—In this paper we provide an intuitive-level discussion
of the challenges and opportunities offered by quantum-based
methods for supporting secure communications, e.g., over a
network. The goal is to distill down to the most fundamental
issues and concepts in order to provide a clear foundation
for assessing the potential value of quantum-based technologies
relative to classical alternatives. It is hoped that this form of
exposition can provide greater clarity of perspective than is
typically offered by mathematically-focused treatments of the
topic. It is also hoped that this clarity extends to more general
applications of quantum information science such as quantum
computing and quantum sensing.
Index Terms—Communication Security; Cryptography; One-
Time Pad; Quantum Computing; Quantum Information;
Quantum-Key Distribution; Quantum Networks; Quantum Sens-
ing; QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum-based technologies exploit physical phenomena that
cannot be efficiently exhibited or simulated using technologies
that exploit purely classical physics. For example, a quantum
sensor may use quantum phenomena to probe a system to
discern classical and/or quantum properties of the system that
cannot be directly measured by classical sensing technologies.
Quantum computing, by contrast, generalizes the classical unit
of information, the bit, in the form of a quantum bit, or qubit,
and exploits quantum computational operators that cannot be
efficiently simulated using classical Boolean-based operators.
Secure quantum-based communication protocols have
emerged as among the first practical technologies for which
advantages over classical alternatives have been rigorously
demonstrated. As will be discussed, however, these advantages
rely on a set of assumptions about the capabilities of potential
adversaries (hackers) as well as those of the communicating
parties. Because the quantum advantage can be lost if
these assumptions are relaxed, the utility of quantum-based
communication must be assessed based on the assumed
scenario in which it will be applied.
In the next section we discuss scenarios in which classical
cryptography can facilitate unconditionally secure communi-
cations. We then discuss a more general class of communi-
cation scenarios in which classical methods cannot provide
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unconditional guarantees of security but may offer practically
sufficient ones. We then provide a high-level description of
how special properties of quantum systems can be exploited
to enlarge the range of scenarios for which unconditional com-
munication security can be achieved. This provides context for
realistically examining how the tantalizing theoretical features
of quantum-based approaches to communication security may
translate to practical advantages over classical alternatives.
II. SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
Suppose two parties, Alice and Bob, know they will have
need for unconditionally secure communications at various
times in the future. If they determine that they are unlikely
to communicate more than a total of n bits before the next
time they meet then they can create a sequence of random bits,
referred to as a one-time pad (OTP), and each keep a copy for
use to mask their messages.
For example, a week later Alice can contact Bob using
whatever unsecure communication medium she chooses, e.g.,
phone or email, and then send her k-bit private message
encrypted by performing an exclusive-or1 (XOR) of it with
the first k bits of the OTP. Upon receipt of the encrypted k-
bit message, Bob will simply invert the mask by applying the
same XOR operation using the first k bits of the OTP.
Even if an eavesdropper, Eve, is able to monitor all com-
munications between Alice and Bob, she will not be able
to access the private information (i.e., original plain-text
messages) without a copy of their OTP. Thus, the OTP protocol
offers unconditional security against eavesdropping, but its
use is limited to parties who have previously established a
shared OTP. The question is whether a secure protocol can be
established between two parties who have never communicated
before.
III. PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION
At first glance it appears that there is no way for Alice
and Bob to communicate for the first time in a way that
is secure against an eavesdropper who has access to every
bit of information they exchange. However, a commonly-used
analogy can quickly convey how this might be done.
1The exclusive-or function of two bits a and b is 0 if are the same and 1
if they differ.
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Suppose Alice wishes to mail a piece of paper containing a
secret message to Bob. To ensure security during transport she
places the paper in a box and applies a lock before sending.
When Bob receives the box he of course can’t open it because
of the lock, but he can apply his own lock and send the box
back to Alice. Upon receipt, Alice removes her lock and sends
the box back to Bob, who can now open it and read the
message.
If it is assumed that the box and locks can’t be compromised
then this protocol is secure even if Eve is able to gain physical
access to the box during transport. An analogous protocol can
be applied to digital information if it is possible for Alice
and Bob to sequentially encrypt a given message and then
sequentially decrypt it. To do so, however, Alice must be able
to remove her encryption mask after Bob has applied his.
In other words, their respective encryption operations must
commute and not be invertible by Eve.
It turns out that no classical protocol can satisfy the neces-
sary properties for unconditional security. However, a prac-
tical equivalent of unconditional security can potentially be
achieved in the sense that Eve may be able to invert the
encryption – but only if she expends thousand years of
computation time. Under the assumption that security of the
message will be irrelevant at that point in the distant future,
the protocol can be regarded as unconditionally secure for all
practical purposes.
At present there are technically no protocols that provably
require such large amounts of computational effort, but some
do if certain widely-believed conjectures (relating to one-way
functions) are true. Assuming that these conjectures are in
fact true, classical public-key protocols would seem to offer
practically the same level of security as a one-time pad but
without the limitation of prior communication.
On the other hand... estimating the expected amount of time
necessary to break a classical public-key protocol is very
difficult. Even if it is assumed that the amount of work
required by Eve grows exponentially with the length of a
critical parameter, a particular value for that parameter must be
chosen. For all existing protocols the value of this parameter
introduces an overhead coefficient (both in computational time
and space) which may not be exponential but may grow
such that the protocol becomes impractical in most real-world
contexts.
Suppose the parameter is selected based on a tradeoff be-
tween practical constraints and a minimum acceptable level
of security, e.g., that it would take Eve 500 years to break
the encryption using the fastest existing supercomputer. What
if Eve can apply 1000 supercomputers and break it in six
months? Or what if she develops an optimized implementation
of the algorithm that is 1000 times faster? Breaking the code
may still require time that is exponential in the value of the
parameter, but the real question is how to estimate the range
of parameter values that are at risk if Eve applies all available
resources to crack a given message.
As an example, in 1977 it was estimated that the time
required to break a message encrypted with the RSA public-
key protocol using a particular parameter value would be
on the order of many quadrillion years. However, improved
algorithms and computing resources permitted messages of
this kind to be broken only four years later, and by 2005 it
was demonstrated that the same could be done in only a day.
The difficulty of making predictions, especially about the
future [3], raises significant doubts about the extent to which
any particular classical public-key scheme truly provides a
desired level of security for all practical purposes, and it
is this nagging concern that motivates interest in quantum-
based protocols that offer true unconditional security, at least
in theory.
IV. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION (QKD)
Quantum-based public-key protocols have been developed that
provide unconditional security guaranteed by the laws of
physics. In the case of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [2],
its security is achieved by exploiting properties that only hold
for qubits. The first is the no-cloning theorem, which says that
the complete quantum state of a qubit cannot be copied. The
second is that a pair of qubits can be generated with entangled
states such that the classical binary value measured for one by
a particular measurement process using parameter valueΘ will
be identical to what is measured for the other using the same
parameter value, but not necessarily if the second measurement
is performed with a different parameter value Θ′ 6= Θ.
The no-cloning theorem is clearly non-classical in the sense
that a qubit stored in one variable can’t be copied into a
different variable the way the content of a classical binary
variable can be copied into another variable or to many other
variables. For example, if the state of a given qubit is somehow
placed into a different qubit then the state of the original qubit
will essentially be erased in the process2. In other words, the
state of the qubit should not be viewed as having been copied
but rather teleported from the first qubit to the second qubit.
If it is simply measured, however, then its state collapses to a
classical bit and all subsequent measurements will obtain the
same result.
Based on these properties, the following simple quantum
communication protocol3 can be defined:
1) Alice and Bob begin by agreeing on a set of k distinct
measurement parameter values Θ = {Θ1,Θ2, ...,Θk}.
This is done openly without encryption, i.e., Eve sees
everything.
2The theoretical physics explaining why quantum states can’t be cloned,
and the details of how qubits are prepared and manipulated, are not important
in the present context for the same reason that details of how classical bits
are implemented in semiconductor devices are not relevant to discussions of
algorithmic issues.
3This toy protocol is intended only to illuminate the key concepts in a way
that links to classical one-time pad (variations can be found in [7]). Much
more complete expositions of the general theory and practice of quantum
cryptography can be found in [1], [4]–[6].
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2) Alice and Bob each separately choose one of the k
parameter values but do not communicate their choices,
thus Eve has no knowledge of them.
3) Alice generates a pair of entangled qubits. She measures
one and sends the other to Bob.
4) Bob reports his measured value. If Alice sees that it
is not the same as hers then she chooses a different
parameter and repeats the process. She does this for each
parameter value until only one is found that always (for
a sufficiently large number of cases) yields the same
measured value as Bob but does not give results expected
for different Θ values.
5) At this point Alice and Bob have established a shared
parameter value that is unknown to Eve. The process can
now be repeated to create a shared sequence of random
bits that can be used like an ordinary one-time pad.
In fact, subsequent communications can be conducted
securely using classical bits.
The security of the above protocol derives from the fact that
Eve cannot clone k copies of a given qubit to measure with
each Θk, and simply measuring transmitted qubits will prevent
Alice and Bob from identifying a unique shared measurement
parameter. In other words, Eve may corrupt the communication
channel but cannot compromise its information. At this point
Alice and Bob can create a shared OTP (which they can verify
are identical by using a checksum or other indicator) and
communicate with a level of security beyond what is possible
for any classical public-key protocol.
V. THE AUTHENTICATION CHALLENGE
For research purposes it is natural to introduce simplifying
assumptions to make a challenging problem more tractable.
The hope is that a solution to the simplified problem will
provide insights for solving the more complex variants that
arise in real-world applications. This was true of the lockbox
example in which it was assumed that Eve might obtain
physical access to the locked box but is not able to dismantle
and reassemble the box, or pick the lock, to access the message
inside. The secure digital communication problem as posed in
this paper also has such assumptions.
Up to now it has been assumed that Eve has enormous
computational resources at her disposal sufficient to over-
come the exponential computational complexity demanded to
break classical protocols. Despite these resources, it has also
been assumed that she is only able to passively monitor the
channel between Alice and Bob. This is necessary because
otherwise she could insert herself and pretend to be Alice
when communicating with Bob and pretend to be Bob when
communicating with Alice. This is referred to as a Man-In-
The-Middle (MITM) attack, which exploits what is known as
the authentication problem.
To appreciate why there can be no general countermeasure
to MITM attacks, consider the case of Eve monitoring all of
Alice’s outgoing communications. At some point Eve sees that
Alice is trying to achieve first-time communication with a guy
named Bob. Eve can intercept the messages intended for Bob
and pretend to be Bob as the two initiate a secure quantum-
based protocol. Pretending to be Alice, Eve does the same with
Bob. Now all unconditionally secure communications involve
Eve as a hidden go-between agent.
In many respects it might seem easier to actively tap into a
physical channel (e.g., optical fiber or copper wire) than to
passively extract information from a bundle of fibers or wires
within an encased conduit, but of course it’s possible to add
physical countermeasures to limit Eve’s ability to penetrate
that conduit. On the other hand, if that can be done then it
might seem possible to do something similar to thwart passive
monitoring.
Ultimately no quantum public-key protocol can be uncon-
ditionally secure without a solution to the authentication
problem. Many schemes have been developed in this regard,
but ultimately they all rely on additional assumptions and/or
restrictions or else involve mechanisms that potentially could
facilitate a comparable level of security using purely classical
protocols.
As an example, suppose a company called Amasoft Lexicon
(AL) creates a service in which customers can login and
communicate with other registered customers such that AL
serves as a trusted intermediary to manage all issues relating
to authentication. This may involve use of passwords, confir-
mation emails or text messages to phones, etc., but ultimately
it must rely on information that was privately established at
some point between itself and each of its customers, e.g., Alice
and Bob.
Suppose each customer is required to set up a strong password.
Initially, how is that information exchanged securely with AL?
One option might be to require the customer to physically visit
a local provider so that the person’s identity can be verified,
and a secure password can be established, without having to
go through an unsecure channel. Okay, but how long must
the password be? If it is to be repeatedly used then it would
become increasingly vulnerable as Eve monitors more and
more messages.
To avoid repeated use of a short password, AL could give
Alice a drive containing 4TB of random bits for an OTP that
would be shared only by her and AL. The same would be
done using a different OTP when Bob registers. Now Alice
can initiate unconditionally secure communicates with AL, and
AL can do the same with Bob, and therefore Alice and Bob
can communicate with unconditional security via AL.
Regardless of whether communications through AL involve
a quantum component, the security of the overall system
depends on the trusted security of AL – and on the security
practices of its customers in maintaining the integrity of
their individual OTPs. The situation can be viewed as one
of replacing one point of vulnerability with a different one.
For example, what prevents Eve from seeking employment at
AL? Are there sufficient internal safeguards to protect against
nefarious actions of AL employees?
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VI. THE COMPLEXITY CHALLENGE
Complexity is a double-edged sword in the context of commu-
nication security. On the one hand it can be used to increase
the computational burden on Eve. On the other hand, it can
introduce more points of vulnerability for her to exploit as the
scale of the implementation (amount of needed software and
hardware) increases.
In the case of quantum-based protocols there is need for
highly complex infrastructure to support the transmission of
qubits and the preservation of entangled states. The details are
beyond the scope of this paper, but it is safe to say that as
implementation details become more concretely specified the
number of identified practical vulnerabilities grows.
An argument can be made that as long as the theory is solid
the engineering challenges will eventually be surmounted.
This may be verified at some point in the indefinite future,
but it is worthwhile to consider the number of practical
security challenges that still exist in current web browsers,
operating systems, etc., despite the recognized commercial and
regulatory interests in addressing them.
The critical question is whether the investment in quantum-
based infrastructure to support quantum-based secure commu-
nication protocols is analogous to a homeowner wanting to
improve his security by installing a titanium front door with
sophisticated intruder detection sensors but not making any
changes to windows and other doors.
The natural response to the titanium door analogy is to agree
that quantum-based technologies represent only one part of
the overall security solution and that of course there are many
other vulnerabilities which also must be addressed. However,
this raises a new question: Is it possible that a complete
solution can be developed that doesn’t require any quantum-
based components?
It may turn out that it is only feasible to guarantee practically
sufficient levels of security (as opposed to unconditional)
and only for specialized infrastructure and protocols tailored
to specific use-cases. If the scope of a given use-case is
sufficiently narrow (e.g., communications of financial infor-
mation among a fixed number of banks) then the prospects for
confidently establishing a desired level of security are greatly
improved. In other words, relative simplicity tends to enhance
trust in the properties of a system because it is difficult to be
fully confident about anything that is too complicated to be
fully understood.
VII. DISCUSSION
The foregoing considerations on the status of quantum-based
approaches for secure communications have leaned strongly
toward a sober, devil’s-advocate perspective4. This was in-
tentional to firmly temper some of the overly-enthusiastic
depictions found in the popular media. For example, the
4See the appendices for more succinct expressions of arguments considered
in this paper.
following is from media coverage of an announcement in May
of 2017 about the launch of a quantum-based “unhackable”
fiber network in China:
“The particles cannot be destroyed or duplicated.
Any eavesdropper will disrupt the entanglement and
alert the authorities,” a researcher at the Chinese
Academy of Sciences is quoted as saying.
Hopefully our discussion thus far clarifies the extent to which
there is a factual basis for this quote and how the implicit con-
clusion (i.e., that the network is “unhackable”) goes somewhat
beyond that basis. One conclusion that cannot be doubted is
that remarkable progress has been made toward implementing
practical systems based on theoretically-proposed quantum
techniques. Another equally-important conclusion that can be
drawn is that China is presently leading this progress.
In many respects the situation is similar to the early days of
radar when it was touted as a sensing modality that could not
be evaded by any aircraft or missile because it had the means
“to see through clouds and darkness.” While this claimed
capability was not inaccurate, that power motivated the devel-
opment of increasingly sophisticated countermeasures to mask
the visibility of aircraft to enemy radar, thus motivating the
development of increasingly more sophisticated technologies
to counter those countermeasures. The lesson from this is that
every powerful technology will demand continuing research
and development to meet new challenges and to support new
applications.
It is likely that the real value of future quantum fiber networks
will not be communication security but rather to support
the needs of distributed quantum sensing applications. More
specifically, quantum information from quantum-based sensors
and related technologies can only be transmitted via special
channels that are implemented to preserve entangled quantum
states. The future is quantum, so the development of infras-
tructure to manage and transmit quantum information has to
be among the highest of priorities.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In retrospect it seems almost ludicrous to suggest that any tech-
nology could ever offer something as unequivocally absolute
as “unconditional guaranteed security,” but that doesn’t mean
quantum-based technologies don’t represent the future state-
of-the-art for maximizing network communication security.
More importantly, surmounting the theoretical and practical
challenges required to realize this state-of-the-art will have
much more profound implications than simply supporting the
privacy concerns of Alice and Bob.
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APPENDIX A
DEVIL’S ADVOCATE ARGUMENTS
• “The theoretical guarantees provided by QKD are only
satisfied under certain assumptions. It may be that those
assumptions can’t be satisfied in any practical implemen-
tation and thus QKD provides no theoretical advantages
over classical alternatives.”
• “If it’s possible to implement the highly-complex infras-
tructure needed to support QKD, and to provide physical
security against MITM attacks, then it should also be
possible to implement physical security against passive
monitoring. If that can be achieved then there is no need
for QKD.”
• “The complexity associated with QKD may make it less
secure than simpler classical alternatives. Just consider
the number of security challenges that still exist in
current web browsers, operating systems, etc., despite
the recognized commercial and regulatory interests in
addressing them.”
• “Progress on the development of classical protocols
(e.g., based on elliptic curve cryptography) may very
well lead to rigorous guarantees about the asymmetric
computational burden imposed on Eve. If so, this would
provide essentially unconditional security for all practical
purposes.”
• “The need for provable unconditional security may be
limited to only a few relatively narrow contexts in which
classical alternatives are sufficient. For example, commu-
nications of financial information among a fixed number
of banks could potentially be supported using classical
one-time pads that are jointly established at regular
intervals.”
• “QKD assumptions on what the physical infrastructure is
required to support, and on what Eve is and is not able
to do, seem to evolve over time purely to conform to the
limits of what the theoretical approach can accommodate.
This raises further doubts about QKD’s true scope of
practical applicability.”
• “Implementing quantum infrastructure to support QKD is
analogous to a homeowner wanting to improve security
by installing a titanium front door but not making any
changes to windows and other doors. In the case of Alice
and Bob, for example, it’s probably much easier for Eve
to place malware on their computers, or place sensors at
their homes, than to identify and compromise a network
link somewhere between them.”
APPENDIX B
REPLIES TO THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE:
• “If demands are set too high at the outset then no
progress can ever be made to improve the status quo.”
• “Even if it is true that most security-critical applications
will demand specially-tailored solutions, the availability
of quantum-based tools will offer greater flexibility in
producing those solutions.”
• “People can assume responsibility for their local security
but have no choice but to trust the security of infrastruc-
ture outside their control.”
• “A network that supports quantum information is un-
questionably more powerful than one that does not. It
is impossible to foresee the many ways this power will
be exploited down the road, but it is hard to imagine that
enhanced security will not be included.”
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